Abstract Network based intrusions have become a serious threat to the users of the Internet. Intruders who wish to attack computers attached to the Internet frequently conceal their identity by staging their attacks through intermediate "stepping stones". This makes tracing the source of the attack substantially more difficult, particularly if the attack traffic is encrypted. In this paper, we address the problem of tracing encrypted connections through stepping stones. The incoming and outgoing connections through a stepping stone must be correlated to accomplish this. We propose a novel correlation scheme based on inter-packet timing characteristics of both encrypted and unencrypted connections. We show that (after some filtering) inter-packet delays (IPDs) of both encrypted and unencrypted, interactive connections are preserved across many router hops and stepping stones. The effectiveness of this method for correlation purposes also requires that timing characteristics be distinctive enough to identify connections. We have found that normal interactive connections such as telnet, SSH and rlogin are almost always distinctive enough to provide correct correlation across stepping stones. The number of packets needed to correctly correlate two connections is also an important metric, and is shown to be quite modest for this method.
Introduction
Network-based intrusions have become a serious threat to users of the Internet. Today, perpetrators can attack networked information systems from virtually anywhere in the world.
One major problem in apprehending and stopping network-based intrusion is that the intruders can easily hide their identity and point of origin through readily available means. One of the techniques most commonly used by intruders is to hide their origin by connecting across multiple stepping stones [4, 14, 18] before attacking the final targets. For example, an attacker logged into host A may telnet into host B, and from there launch an attack on host C. An analysis of the traffic at C will only reveal it is being attacked from B, but will not identify the actual source of the attack. A careful inspection of the contents of the traffic coming into and going out of B may reveal that A is the source of the attack. However, if the traffic arriving at B is encrypted (using SSH [7, 16] or IPSEC [3] ) before being transmitted to C, it will not be possible to use the traffic contents for correlation purposes. Network-based intruders thus have an easy way to launch attacks without revealing their identity. Without a means of effectively and quickly tracing the source of an attack back to its source, it will not be possible to stop further attacks or punish those who are responsible.
In this paper, we address the problem of correlating the incoming and outgoing connections of a stepping stone. The goal is to identify which connections are part of an attack path, so that the attack can be traced back to its source. We assume that attack traffic may be encrypted at any stepping stone in an attempt to interfere with correlation. We propose a novel scheme based on the inter-packet timing characteristics of both encrypted and unencrypted connections. While, as with most intrusion tracing and detection systems, out correlation scheme could be evaded by highly sophisticated intruders, it is our goal to make it difficult to do so and thus deter network-based intrusions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a summary of related works. In section 3, we formulate the correlation problem of our focus and give our correlation problem solution model. In section 4, we discuss IPD (Inter-Packet Delay) based correlation in detail. In section 5, we evaluate correlation effectiveness of our proposed correlation metrics through experiments. In section 5, we conclude with summary of our findings. [10] CIS [2] Network-Based Thumb printing [14] ON/OFF-Based [18] Deviation-Based [17] IDIP [9] SWT [16] IPD-Based (proposed method)
Related Work
Most of the existing work on correlating connections across stepping stones assumes the traffic is unencrypted. In general, attack tracing approaches can be categorized as either being host-based or network-based. In a host-based approach, the stepping stone itself participates in the tracing, while in the network-based approaches, the stepping stones are not used for tracing purposes. Based on how the traffic is traced, tracing approaches can further be classified as either active or passive. Passive approaches monitor and compare all traffic, allowing any traffic to be traced at any time. On the other hand, active approaches dynamically control when, where, what and how the traffic is to be correlated, through customized packet processing. They only trace the traffic of interest when needed. Table 2 .1 provides a classification of existing tracing approaches, as well as our proposed tracing mechanism.
The Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) [10] developed at UC Davis is a host-based tracing mechanism that attempts to keep track of all the users in the network and report all activities to network-wide intrusion detection systems. The Caller Identification System (CIS) [2] is another host-based tracing mechanism. It eliminates centralized control by utilizing a truly distributed model. Each host along the connection chain keeps a record about its view of the connection chain so far.
A fundamental problem with the host-based tracing approach is its trust model. Host-based tracing places its trust upon the monitored hosts themselves. In specific, it depends on the correlation of connections at every host in the connection chain. If one host is compromised and is providing misleading correlation information, the whole tracing system is fooled. Because host-based tracing requires the participation and trust of every host involved in the network-based intrusion, it is very difficult to be applied in the context of the public Internet.
Network-based tracing is the other category of tracing approaches. It does not require the participation of monitored hosts, nor does it place its trust on the monitored hosts. Rather, it is based on the assumption that one or more properties of a connection chain is maintained throughout the chain. In particular, the thumbprint [14] is a pioneering correlation technique that utilizes a small quantity of information to summarize connections. Ideally it can uniquely distinguish a connection from unrelated connections and correlate successfully those connections in the same connection chain.
Sleepy Watermark Tracing (SWT) [[16] ] applies principles of steganography and active networking in tracing and correlating unencrypted connections through stepping stones. By injecting watermarks in the traffic echoed back to the attacker, SWT is able to trace and correlate even a single keystroke by the intruder. By actively generating tracing traffic, it can trace and correlate even when an intrusion connection is idle.
IDIP (the Intrusion Identification and Isolation Protocol) [9] is a part of Boeing's Dynamic Cooperating Boundary Controllers Program that uses an active approach to trace the incoming path and source of the intrusion. In this method, boundary controllers collaboratively locate and block the intruder by exchanging intrusion detection information, namely, attack descriptions.
The ON/OFF-based scheme [18] by Zhang and Paxson is the first correlation intended to correlate traffic across stepping stones even if the traffic is encrypted by the stepping stone. The method is based on correlation of the ends of OFF periods (or equivalently the beginnings of ON periods) of interactive traffic, rather than the connection contents. While it is robust against payload padding, ON/OFF-based correlation requires that the packets of connections have precise, synchronized timestamps in order to be able to correlate them. This makes correlations of measurements taken at different points in the network difficult or impractical.
The deviation-based approach [17] by Yoda and Etoh is another network-based correlation scheme. It defines the minimum average delay gap between the packet streams of two TCP connections as the deviation. The deviation-based approach considers both the packet timing characteristics and their TCP sequence numbers. It does not require clock synchronization and is able to correlate connections observed at different points of network. However, it can only correlate TCP connections that have one-to-one correspondences in their TCP sequence numbers, and thus is not able to correlate connections where padding is added to the payload, e.g., when certain types of encryption are used.
Both ON/OFF-based and deviation-based approaches define their correlation metrics over the entire duration of the connections to be correlated. This makes the correlation applicable to post-attack traces only.
The IPD-based approach we discuss in the remainder of the paper defines its correlation metric over the sliding window of packets of the connections to be correlated. This enables it to correlate both live traffic (at real-time) and collected traces (post-attack). It supports distributed correlation of traffic measure at different points of network and is robust against payload padding.
Problem Formulation
A connection c i (also called a flow) is a single connection from computer host H i (the source) to host H i+1 (the destination). A user may log into a sequence of hosts H 1 , H 2 , … H n+1 through a connection chain c 1 , c 2 , … c n , where connection c i is a remote login from host H i to host H i+1 . 1 The tracing problem is, given connection c n , to determine the other connections c 1 , c 2 , … c n-1 in the chain, and only those connections. From these connections the identities of all the hosts in the chain, including H 1 , may be directly determined. 2 
Correlation Problem Solution Model
Let Ĉ represent the set of all connections being examined. We can define an ideal correlation function CF: Ĉ × Ĉ → {0, 1} such that CF(c i , c j ) = 1 iff c i and c j are in the same connection chain, otherwise CF(c i , c j ) = 0. To solve the tracing problem we must find such a function CF.
In practice, connection correlation is based on the characteristics of the connections, which may include packet contents, header information (such as packet size) and packet arrival and/or departure times. The connection characteristics can be modeled by a metric function of the connection M: Ĉ × P → Z (3.1) Where Ĉ is the set of connections to be correlated, P is some domain of parameters and Z is the correlation metric domain.
Based on the connection metric, a correlation value function (CVF) can be defined as
Where the result of CVF is a real number between 0 and 1. To approximate CF through CVF, we introduce a threshold 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 such that c i and c j are considered correlated iff
Therefore the tracing problem is now replaced by the following: find or construct M, p, CVF and δ such that In finding M, p, CVF and δ, the key is to identify those unique characteristics of connections that are invariant across routers and stepping-stones. If those identified invariant characteristics of connections are distinctive enough to exclude other unrelated connections, reliable correlation of connections can be constructed from these metrics.
IPD Based Correlation of Encrypted Connections
In principle, correlation of connections is based on inherent characteristics of connections. To correlate potentially encrypted connections, the key is to identify a correlation metric from the connection characteristics that is: 1) invariant across routers and stepping stones; 2) not affected by encryption and decryption; 3) unique to each connection chain. Potential candidates for the correlation metric of a flow of packets include header information, packet size, inter-packet timing etc. In particular, inter-packet timing should not be affected by encryption and decryption. We now present an original correlation method based on inter-packet delays or IPDs.
General IPD Based Correlation Model
The overall IPD correlation of two connections is a two-step process. First, the two connections to be correlated are processed to generate a number of correlation points between the two connections. Second, these generated correlation points are evaluated to obtain the correlation value of the two connections.
The rationale behind this two-step process is to support the true real-time correlation, which is the capability to correlate "live" traffic when they come and go. This means that the approach must be able to correlate connections before their ends are reached. Therefore, the correlation metric for true real-time correlation cannot be defined over the entire duration of a connection; we choose instead to compute it over a window of packets in the connection. A correlation point generated from IPDs within the window reflects some localized similarity between the two flows; the correlation value obtained from all the correlation points will indicate the overall similarity of the two flows.
4.1.1
Basic IPD Correlation Concepts and Definitions Given a bi-directional connection, we can split it into two unidirectional flows. We define our correlation metric over the unidirectional flow of connections.
Given a unidirectional flow of n > 1 packets, we use t i to represent the timestamp of the i th packet observed at some point of the network. We assume all the t i 's of a flow are measured at the same observation point with the same clock. We define the i th inter-packet delay (IPD) as
Therefore, for any flow consisting of n > 1 packets, we can measure the interpacket delay (IPD) vector <d 1 
Ideally, the IPD vector would uniquely identify each flow and we could construct our correlation metric from the IPD vectors. To support real-time correlation based on the IPD vector, we define the IPD correlation window W j, s on <d 1 
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n represents the starting point of the window, and 1 ≤ s ≤ n-j+1 is the size of the window.
Given any two flows X and Y, whose IPD vectors are <x 1 , …x m > and <y 1 , …y n > respectively, we define a Correlation Point Function CPF over IPD correlation windows of X: W j,s (X) and of Y:
where φ is a function of two vectors:
is the start of the IPD correlation window, -j+1 ≤ k ≤ n-j-s+1 is the offset between the two IPD correlation windows, and 1 ≤ s ≤ min (m, n) is the size of the two IPD correlation windows. CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) quantitatively expresses the correlation between W j, s (<x 1 , …x m >) and W j+k, s (<y 1 , …y n >) as shown in 
Inter-Packet Delay Based Correlation for Tracing Encrypted Connections Through
Stepping Stones 7 j, k, s) may have a different value for each different value of k. We are interested in the maximum value of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) for any particular value of j. We define (j, j+k) as a correlation point if
where δ cp is the correlation point threshold with value between 0 and 1. The δ cp here is for detecting correlation point and is different from δ in inequality (3.3).
We further define k for this correlation point (j, j+k) as the correlation-offset of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) and the correlation point.
Given flow X, Y, correlation window size s and threshold δ cp , by applying formula (4.4), we can obtain a series of correlation points: (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ),… (x n , y n ) where n ≥ 0.
Assuming one packet of flow X corresponds to one packet of flow Y 3 , if flow X and Y are really part of the same connection chain, the IPDs of flow X should have a one-to-one correspondence with the IPDs of flow Y. In this case, all the correlation points should have same correlation-offset. This can be formally represented with CPF as
That is there exists an offset k' such that CPF(X, Y, j, k', s) is closest to 1 for all possible j. In this case, all the correlation points (x, y) will be covered by a linear function y=x+k'.
After obtaining n>0 correlation points: (j 1 , j 1 +k 1 ), (j 2 , j 2 +k 2 ), …, (j n , j n +k n ), we represent those n correlation points with two n-dimensional vectors C x =< j 1, … j n > and C y =< j 1 +k 1, … j n +k n >. The Correlation Value Function formula (3.3) is now transformed to
In summary, the metric function M in formula (3.1) is now mapped to CPF, the parameter domain P in formula (3.1) is mapped to s and δ cp , and Z in formula (3.1) is mapped to n-dimensional vectors C x =< j 1, … j n > and C y =< j 1 +k 1, … j n +k n >.
Correlation Method Assessment Criteria
A critical issue in this method is the choice of the function φ for computing the correlation point function CPF. Criteria by which the method may be judged include: Ideally, we would expect a perfect correlation method 1) has unique perfect correlation; 2) has a 100% CP true positive rate; and 3) has 0 misses or false positives.
Correlation Point Functions
We now propose four correlation point functions, each of which enjoys certain advantages or applicability, as discussed below.
4.2.1
Mini/Max Sum Ratio (MMS) One simple metric to quantitatively express the "similarity" between two vectors is the ratio between the summation of the minimum elements and the summation of the maximum elements.
The range of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) MMS is [0, 1]. Only when x i =y i+k for i=j, …, j+k-1, will CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) MMS have the value 1 . Therefore, CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) MMS is likely to exhibit unique perfect correlation.
4.2.2
Statistical Correlation (STAT) Based on the concept of the coefficient of correlation from statistics [1] , we can define 
, there may be more than one value of W j+k,s (Y) for which CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) Stat has the value 1. For example, for a particular W j,s (X), any linear transform of W j,s (X): W j+k,s (Y) =a×W j,s (X) +b will result in CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) Stat being equal to 1 (a>0) or -1 (a<0). CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) Stat is therefore less likely to exhibit unique perfect correlation, and is more likely to result in false positives.
4.2.3
Normalized Dot Product 1 (NDP1) In digital signal processing, linear correlation (or matched filtering) of two discrete signals will reach a maximum at the point where the signals have the most similarity. It is well known that linear correlation is optimal in detecting the similarity between a discrete signal and the corresponding signal distorted by additive, white Gaussian noise. However the range of linear correlation is not necessarily between 0 and 1.
If the discrete signals are replaced by two vectors, the corresponding operation to linear correlation of signals is the inner-product or dot-product of two vectors in ndimensional space. From linear algebra, the inner-product (or dot-product) of two ndimensional vectors is equal to the cosine of the angle between the two vectors, multiplied by the lengths of the two vectors. That is: Among these four proposed correlation point functions, Mini/MaxSum Ratio (MMS) is likely to be the most sensitive to local details of the IPD vectors to be correlated. This is because it does not average any differences, and it accumulates all the IPD differences. As a result, MMS may potentially have a lower true positive rate due to its emphasis on local details. While the STAT CPF is much more robust to noise, we expect it to have substantially more false positives. The normalized dot product functions (NDP1 and NDP2) are likely to be in between MMS and STAT in terms of sensitivity to local detail and robustness to noise.
Correlation Value Function
Given flows X, Y, correlation window size s and threshold δ, by applying formula (4.4), we can potentially obtain a set of correlation points: (j 1 , j 1 +k 1 ), (j 2 , j 2 +k 2 ), …, (j n , j n +k n ). We represent this sequence of correlation points through two n-dimensional vectors C x =< j 1, … j n > and C y =< j 1 +k 1, … j n +k n >.
We 
ρ CVF(C x ,C y ) quantitatively expresses the overall correlation between flows X and Y, and its value range is [-1, 1]. When there exists more than one correlation point and all the correlation points have same correlation offset (i.e., k 1 =k 2 =…k n ), CVF(C x ,C y ) = 1. When flow X and Y has only one correlation point, CVF(C x ,C y )=1. When flow X and Y have no correlation point, CVF(C x ,C y ) is defined to be 0.
Limitations and Countermeasures
The effectiveness of IPD-based correlation relies on the uniqueness of IPDs of connections. It may be ineffective at differentiating uncorrelated connections that exhibit very similar IPD patterns, such as file transfers accomplished via FTP.
Interactive traffic, as we show later in the experiments section, usually has IPD patterns that are distinctive enough for our purposes.
Intruders could thwart IPD-based correlation by deliberately changing the interpacket delays of a connection in a chain. Such delays may be designed to reduce the true positive rate, or increase the number of false positives. There are relatively simple means of accomplishing such traffic shaping, although they may require kernel-level manipulations. The amount of delay that can be added by the intruder is limited by the maximum delay that is tolerable for interactive traffic. Another countermeasure against IPD-based correlation is to set some connection into line mode while keeping other connection in character mode. This could potentially merge several packets into one bigger packet. However, the server side shell could always dynamically turn off the line mode [15] . Other countermeasures include: • Injecting "padding" packets that can be removed by the application • Segmenting one flow into multiple flows and reassembling them, again at the application level It is an area of future work to address such countermeasures.
Experiments
The goal of the experiments is to answer the following questions about IPD based correlation: 1) are inter-packet delays preserved through routers and stepping stone, and to what extent? 2) are inter-packet delays preserved across encryption/decryption and various network applications (such as telnet/rlogin/SSH)? 3) how effective is the IPD-based correlation metric in detecting connections which are part of the same chain? 4) how well does the IPD-based correlation metric differentiate a connection from connections that are not part of the same chain?
Correlation Point Experiment
To answer the first two questions, we have conducted the following experiment. We first telnet'ed from a Windows 2000 PC behind a cable modem connected to an ISP in North Carolina to a Sun workstation via VPN. From the workstation, we used SSH to This suggests that with correlation window size 15, the threshold δ cp of 0.95 is probably too high for MMS. The correlation points missed by correlation windows size 15 and threshold δ cp of 0.95 are actually due to correlation-offset shifts. The correlation-offset between our sample flows X and Y has shifted 3 times between the start and finish. This indicates that a telnet packet may trigger more than one SSH packet, or vice versa. Fortunately, such correlation-offset shifts are infrequent between correlated flows. Generally, a larger correlation window size is very effective in filtering out false positives, and a higher threshold δ cp tends to filter out both true positive and false positive correlation points. An excessively large correlation window size with a high threshold δ cp tends to have a low true positive rate, due to both correlation-offset shifts and IPD variations introduced by the network. Figure 5 .3 compares the detected correlation points between flow X and Y by different CPFs: MMS, STAT, NDP1 and NDP2, with identical correlation window sizes of 10 and threshold δ cp of 0.80. As expected, the statistical CPF results in substantially more false positives than the other three CPFs. While NDP2 has slightly fewer false positives than NDP1, they both have somewhat more false positives than MMS. Generally, MMS is very sensitive to localized details of IPDs and is able to accurately correlate the flows using a smaller correlation window (i.e. 5). NDP1 and NDP2 are less effective with a small correlation window, but they are able to correlate effectively with a moderate window size (15 or 20) . The statistical CPF appears to fail to consider enough localized details to correlate accurately
Aggregated Flow Correlation Experiment
To evaluate more generally the performance of the different correlation point functions, we have used five sets of flows (Table 5 .1). FS1 and FS2 were collected at two ends of connection chains similar to the scenario shown in Figure 5 .1. FS1 and FS2 contain 16 SSH flows and 15 Telnet flows, respectively; for each flow in FS2, there is one flow in FS1 which was in the same connection chain. FS3 and FS4 are derived from 5 million packet headers and 12 million packet headers of the Auckland-IV traces of NLANR [6] . FS5 is derived from over 49 million packet headers of the Bell Lab-I traces of NLANR [6] . We have conducted four sets of aggregated correlation experiments. For all of these experiments, two flows were regarded as being correlated if the CVF of their correlation points (equation (4.13)) was greater than δ=0.6.The first set tests how well different correlation metrics (CPF) detects correlation between sets FS1 and FS2. The second set of experiments shows the correlation detection effectiveness by different correlation metrics. We use combined flow set of FS3 and FS4 (279 flows) and flow set FS5 (400 flows) to correlate themselves respectively. The third experiment is intended to evaluate the ability of the different correlation point functions to successfully discriminate flows not part of the same chain. The fourth experiment similarly investigated the false positive rate, this time between sets FS3 and FS4. Figure 5.7 shows the results. The number of false positives (out of 144*133 = 19152) for MMS, NDP1 and NDP2 decreases dramatically when the correlation window size increases; that of MMS decreases faster than NDP1 and NDP2. Again, the statistical correlation metric has a consistently higher FP rate with increasing correlation window size. For the MMS method, a window size of 20 0r 25 packets is sufficient to reduce the false positive rate to a fraction of a percent.
MMS Correlation Points with Window
In summary, we have found that MMS is very effective in both detecting interactive, correlated flows and differentiating uncorrelated flows with even relatively small correlation window sizes (10, 15) . NDP1 and NDP2 are not as sensitive as MMS with small correlation windows; however, they both perform well with larger correlation windows. We have confirmed that the statistical correlation metric is not effective in detecting correlation and differentiating uncorrelated flows. We have measured the number of calculations of correlation points per second achieved by our unoptimized code. Table 5 .2 shows the average number of millions of correlation point calculation per second of various correlation point functions under different load. Despite dynamic overheads of disk operation, the overall throughput remains largely constant at various loads.
Correlation Performance

Conclusions
Tracing intrusion connections through stepping-stones at real-time is a challenging problem, and encryption of some of the connections within the connection chain makes tracing even harder. We have addressed the tracing problem of encrypted connections based on the inter-packet delays of the connections. We proposed and investigated four correlation point functions. Our correlation metric does not require clock synchronization, and allows correlation of measurements taken at widely scattered points. Our method also requires only small packet sequences (on the order of a few dozen packets) for correlation. We have found that after some filtering, IPDs (Inter-Packet Delay) of both encrypted and unencrypted, interactive connections are largely preserved across many hops stepping-stones. We have demonstrated that both encrypted and unencrypted, interactive connections can be effectively correlated and differentiated based on IPD characteristics. Our experiments also indicate that correlation detection is significantly dependent on the uniqueness of flows. We have found that normal interactive connections such as telnet, SSH and rlogin are almost always unique enough to be differentiated from connections not in the same chain. While bulk data transfer with SSH connection introduces an additional challenge in correlation detection, its impact on correlation differentiation may simply be offset by larger correlation windows and higher correlation point thresholds.
A natural area of future work is to extend the correlation to non-interactive traffic. How to address countermeasures with "bogus packets" and packet splitting and merging remains an open problem.
